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Abstract: Is drastic action against global warming essential to avoid impoverishing 
our descendants? Or does it mean robbing the poor to give to the rich? We do not yet 
know. Yet most of us can agree on the importance of minimising expected 
deprivation. Because of the vast number of future generations, if there is any 
significant risk of catastrophe, this implies drastic and expensive carbon abatement 
unless we discount the future. I argue that we should not discount. Instead, the rich 
countries should stump up the funds to support abatement both for themselves and the 
poor states of the world. Yet to ask the present generation to assume all the costs of 
drastic mitigation.is unfair. Worse still, it is politically unrealistic. We can square the 
circle by shifting part of the burden to our descendants. Even if we divert investment 
from other parts of the economy or increase public debt, future people should be 
richer, so long as we avert catastrophe. If so, it is fair for them to assume much of the 
cost of abatement. What we must not do is to expose them to the threat of disaster by 
not doing enough. 
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 Concern is growing that climate change could prove worse than we expect. 
Recent economic analyses have laid increasing stress on unlikely but catastrophic 
dangers (Summers and Zeckhauser, 2008; Weitzman, 2007; Weitzman, 2009). Martin 
Weitzman (2009, p. 1) estimates a roughly five percent chance of a rise of more than 
10°C over roughly the next two centuries, and a one percent chance of a rise of more 
than 20°C. Such runaway global warming could impoverish the planet on a scale from 
which human beings would find it hard to recover (Godard, 2009, p. 17; McKinnon, 
2009). Yet greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to rise in both North and South. 
And many claim that it is only fair to present-day people that they should do so. 
 Perhaps the most widely accepted claim about justice between generations is 
that we should leave our descendants enough to meet their basic needs and lead 
worthy and satisfying lives (Krebs, 2001; Meyer and Roser, 2009). This reflects the 
widely shared belief that a key goal must be to reduce deprivation (Casal, 2007, p. 
299), an aim that is shared even by critics of more demanding theories of 
intergenerational justice (Beckerman, 1999, pp. 85, 88; Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, 
p. 89). It is also widely agreed that poor countries will suffer the worst effects of 
global warming.
1
 One might think that this implies slashing GHG emissions. Yet the 
most compelling objection to drastic cuts appeals to equity: the expectation that our 
descendants will be richer than we are.  
 Whether we should ‘discount’ consumption benefits to future people—in large 
part because they will be richer—lay at the centre of the debate over the 2006 Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Critics argued that on Stern’s 
projections, even with substantial climate change, future people would still be many 
times wealthier in 2200 than they are today (Godard, 2008, p. 33). The Review, Partha 
Dasgupta (2007, p. 6) charged, had assumed that ‘that the distribution of well-being 
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among people doesn’t matter much, that we should spend huge amounts for later 
generations even if, adjusting for risk, they were expected to be much better off than 
us.' The present paper argues that Stern was right not to discount the consumption of 
future people. The problem with most economic analyses lies deeper—namely, in the 
assumption that we should maximize utility in the first place. 
 In the last forty years, utility-maximisation, still largely taken for granted by 
economists analysing climate change, has come under sustained philosophical attack. 
The most influential political theory of the second half of the twentieth century, John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971/1999), explicitly rejects utilitarianism in favour of 
giving priority to the worst off. Others stress the importance of ensuring that people 
have enough to lead sufficient lives—after which point further increases in 
consumption or utility matter less, or not at all (Frankfurt, 1987; Huseby, 2010). Both 
views have played a role in the climate change debate, and both can explain why we 
must not sacrifice today’s poor to tomorrow’s rich. 
 Extended to the intergenerational context, the priority and sufficiency views 
require us to minimise deprivation—now and in the future. If we knew for sure that 
future generations of human beings would be materially richer, then that would 
weaken the case for slashing GHG emissions. But disaster cannot be ruled out. Faced 
with catastrophic threats, we should minimise expected deprivation. Since runaway 
global warming could affect so many for so long, prioritarianism and 
sufficientarianism both imply drastic abatement.  By any moral measure, the North 
should pay for it. But if it refuses, action is needed even if it comes at the expense of 
the South.  
 In reality, neither the North nor the South appears ready to step up to the plate. 
We must tap resources from somewhere—and better from rich people than from poor 
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ones. This article argues that we should look to the rich of the future. If we can shift 
part of the burden of GHG abatement to our descendants, it is entirely fair to do so. 
Provided we avert catastrophe, this should still leave future people richer than their 
counterparts today. They will be able to pay off debt, replace infrastructure or do 
without some natural resources without giving up too much. What would be truly 
wrong would be to risk disaster by not doing enough. 
THE LONG SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
 Much of the effect of our GHG emissions is likely to endure for hundreds or 
thousands of years. This makes the weight we accord to future people extraordinarily 
important (Grubb, 1995, p. 472). Utilitarianism normally weights everyone’s well-
being equally, exposing it to the objection that it can demand huge sacrifices. Any 
permanent loss, however small, becomes with time all but infinitely costly. In the case 
of global warming, GHG abatement ‘would confer benefits not only in 2100 but in 
every subsequent year, perhaps for millions of years’ (Posner, 2004, p. 152). We 
might be required to make huge sacrifices for the sake of trivial future benefits, 
because over time those benefits would add up to be so great (Nordhaus, 2008, pp. 
182-83).  
 We can undertake a good deal of abatement at minimal cost. Some measures 
may even save us money (Spash, 2005, pp. 162-63). Still, critics argue that climate 
mitigation on the scale envisioned by Al Gore or the Stern Review will not come 
cheap. While William Nordhaus estimates that even these plans are likely to cost less 
than two percent of world income (2008, p. 90; cf. Helm, 2008; Quiggin, 2008, p. 
195), in absolute terms this is a large sum. At the same time, economists widely 
expect per capita consumption to go on rising (Dietz, Hepburn and Stern, 2008, p. 
378). This raises an objection to deep emissions cuts on grounds of equity: ‘Can we 
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justify current generations sacrificing 2-3% of GWP to increase the wealth of future 
generations who even after deduction for the high damage scenario are 2-15 times 
richer than the present generation?’ (Lind, 1995, p. 384.)  
 It is bad enough that refusing to discount could require today’s rich to sacrifice 
for those who will be richer tomorrow. What is really troubling is that drastic 
abatement could impose a heavy burden on the world’s poor. ‘[T]he one thing that is 
certain about the global warming issue is that an immediate significant cut in fossil 
fuel consumption means a drastic cut in world energy consumption and hence in 
standards of living’, warns Wilfred Beckerman (1995, p. 79). ‘And the social and 
political upheavals to which this would lead would also be catastrophic. 
Furthermore...a rise in income levels is the only way that the urgent environmental 
problems facing the 75 per cent of the world's population that live in developing 
countries can be overcome.' While rich countries may be able to weather a depression 
without widespread death and disease, this is not true of the poor ones (Beckerman, 
1995, p. 16; Malnes, 1995, p. 125).  
 The solution, in the eyes of many economists, is to discount benefits to future 
people. This will prevent the present from being sacrificed to an immensely populous 
future (Arrow, 1999, pp. 14-15). Moreover, discounting seems consistent with the 
standard assumption that an additional unit of income to the rich provides less utility 
than the same increment to the poor. As Colin Price (2003) notes, diminishing 
marginal utility is widely seen as the ‘respectable case for discounting’.  
 Nevertheless, this solution is ad hoc: discounting the future does nothing to 
solve the general problem that utilitarianism is too demanding (Caney, 2008, pp. 549-
50). Moreover, it misleadingly implies that future people’s consumption counts for 
less, when what we really mean is that the consumption of the rich matters less, or 
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that we value equality among generations, or that no generation should be asked to 
give up too much. Worse yet, utilitarianism still requires that the poor be sacrificed to 
the rich if the latter can gain enough. Seeking to avoid this, we might put another 
finger on the scales, so that benefits that convey the same amount of utility matter 
more when they go to the badly off (Cowen and Parfit, 1992, pp. 148-49). 
Nevertheless, if there are enough well-off people, or if the benefits extend far enough 
into the future, the needs of the poor can still be outweighed by the luxuries of the rich 
(Crisp, 2003, p. 754; Meyer and Roser, 2009, pp. 234-35; Roser, 2009b, p. 15).  
 The root of the problem is the belief that we should maximize utility in the 
first place. In fact, the duty seems much clearer to ensure a ‘minimum level of well-
being below which no generation should fall’ (Roser, 2009b, pp. 13-15; quotation 
from Broome, 1992, p. 106). This is usually presented as protecting people’s rights 
(Caney, 2008; Spash, 2005). Even those who reject strong positive obligations to the 
inhabitants of other countries can agree that it is wrong, other things being equal, to 
harm them (Shapcott, 2008). The same goes for other generations (Davidson, 2008). 
Thomas Schelling’s comparison of climate change mitigation with foreign aid misses 
the mark because the question is not one of helping future people (Sunstein, 2007, pp. 
266-67). A closer analogy would be with not raping and pillaging one’s neighbours.  
 Still, we should not focus on the negative right not to be harmed by climate 
change to the exclusion of the positive right to development. Some draw a sharp 
distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission, seeing only the former 
as rights violations. Anthropogenic climate change is an act of commission, whereas 
many see failing to address poverty as an act of omission (Dasgupta, 2008, p. 159; 
Spash, 2005, pp. 230-31). Indeed, if our duty to our fellow creatures is simply to 
avoid harming them, or to leave them ‘enough and as good’ of the earth’s natural 
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endowment as we have enjoyed ourselves, then we can easily justify draconian 
environmental protection (Elliot, 1986; cf. Davidson, 2008). Yet many will find this 
implausibly libertarian. If the same resources can spare ten people from the effects of 
climate change or save a thousand from naturally-occurring malaria, are we really 
obliged to choose the former on the grounds that anthropogenic carbon emissions 
violate people’s negative rights, whereas anopheles mosquitos do not? Surely it is 
unfair that anyone should suffer undeservedly, whether as the result of human-
induced harm or natural circumstances (Arneson, 2000, p. 346). 
PRIORITY TO THE DEPRIVED 
 If we reject a sharp distinction between negative and positive rights, perhaps it 
is best to aim at minimizing deprivation (cf. Wolf, 2009, p. 356). Both the priority and 
sufficiency views stress this goal, but they define it differently. Prioritarians in turn 
differ among themselves in how much preference they accord to the worst-off. The 
worse off a person is, the greater value weighted prioritarianism accords to benefiting 
her. Nevertheless, benefits to the well-off can outweigh this preference if they are big 
enough. In contrast, Rawls (1971/1999) rejects utilitarianism in favour of absolute 
priority for the worst-off (Crisp, 2003, pp. 752-54). Under conditions of moderate 
scarcity, if everyone followed this rule, it would guarantee enough to live on. In the 
real world, however, where some face extreme scarcity and not everybody does as 
Rawls says they should, absolute priority could mean unacceptable tradeoffs 
(McKerlie, 1994; Wolf, 2009, p. 357). If climate change threatens to kill a hundred 
people, absolute prioritarianism may require us to prevent this even if the same 
resources spent differently could rescue a million people from desperate poverty.
2
  
 Sufficientarians seek to ensure that people can lead a satisfactory life. They set 
the bar higher than survival: a sufficient life entails more than ‘merely having enough 
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to get along or enough to make life marginally tolerable’, and is ‘deeply satisfying’ 
(Frankfurt, 1987, p. 38; Frankfurt, 1997, p. 5). Whereas absolute prioritarianism says 
we must give priority to the worst off regardless of the cost, sufficientarianism may 
allow us to help another group of badly off people, if we can do more for them, or if 
they are greater in number (Meyer and Roser, 2009, p. 224; Wolf, 2009, p. 352). Yet 
our goal cannot be simply to maximize the proportion of people with good lives. That 
would do too little for those in desperation. It would tell us to help two poor people 
rather than one person who is starving.
3
 The most plausible solution combines the 
sufficiency and priority views. It gives absolute priority to ensuring that people have 
what they need for a good life, and weighted priority to reducing more severe 
deprivation  (Crisp, 2003; Brown, 2005). We thus give priority to reducing average 
deprivation, measured in terms both of its extent and its severity.
4
 
 If future people are our moral equals, there seems no reason not to minimize 
deprivation between generations as well as within them. This means putting the needs 
of the hungry present before the wealthy future (Gaspart and Gosseries, 2007). It also 
means putting poor countries before rich ones. The latter should bear most of the 
burden of mitigating climate change. Compared with the North, even decades later 
much of the South is likely to be poor. Spending by rich states today will still help 
people—now or in the future—who are on average worse off (Schelling, 1995, pp. 
398-99). Even so, some say the North would get more bang for its buck by spending 
the money on other things. Rich states could pay compensation to poor ones for 
climate change, offer direct assistance in adaptation, or simply invest the money in 
other worthy projects, such as wiping out malaria.
5
  In short, it may seem that equity 
speaks for not for putting the brakes on climate change, but helping the poor ride it 
out.  
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THE THREAT OF DISASTER 
 This is not the case. While investing elsewhere may enable us to protect or 
compensate future generations, there is no guarantee that we will actually do it. We or 
our children might blow the money in a spending spree instead. Even if environmental 
preservation has a lower aggregate payoff, it may be a surer means of seeing that the 
benefits reach the right parties (Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 1993, pp. 297-98; Lind, 
1995; Tremmel, 2009, p. 73). Moreover, though poor humans may adapt to climate 
change, many non-humans clearly will not (Shue, 1995, p. 255). Worldwide, there are 
fifty birds for every human. Even in densely settled Britain, wild mammals 
considerably outnumber human beings (Gleich, Maxeiner, Miersch and Nicolay, 
2002, pp. 262-67). The destruction of these animals’ habitats can only produce 
enormous suffering. If animals have moral standing, then intergenerational justice 
must take account of their interests (Krebs, 2003). Finally, climate change could turn 
out worse than we expect, and leave our descendants poorer than we are.  
 Many argue that we should discount the future because future people will be 
richer. The sensible ones recognise that this is a gamble, even if it is a gamble with 
good odds (Sunstein, 2007, p. 258). Even an optimist like Beckerman admits the 
‘remote possibility’ that global warming could impoverish future generations 
(Beckerman and Hepburn, 2007, pp. 190-91; Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, pp. 99, 
105). If we are very unlucky, it could ‘effectively destroy planet Earth as we know it’ 
(Weitzman, 2009, p. 5) or even leave the earth uninhabitable (Broome, 1992, pp. 15-
16, 23). Martin Weitzman (2009, p. 1) notes ‘deep structural uncertainty in the science 
coupled with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the catastrophic losses 
from disastrous temperature changes. The climate science seems to be saying that the 
  9   
probability of a disastrous collapse of planetary welfare is nonnegligible, even if this 
tiny probability is not objectively knowable.'   
 One of the most prominent advocates of a go-slow approach to climate 
mitigation, William Nordhaus (2008, pp. 28, 145-47), rules out such ‘genuinely 
catastrophic outcomes’ by assumption, noting that ‘preliminary runs’ of his model 
‘suggest’ that we do not need to worry about ‘a permanent Great Depression, 
civilizational collapse, or even human extinction.' Yet he confesses that ‘[u]ntil 
geophysical modelers develop mechanisms for generating abrupt or catastrophic 
changes, there is little that economic models…can do to introduce results based on 
established scientific findings in integrated assessment models’. Indeed, ‘[w]e cannot 
rule out the potential for catastrophic impacts that might justify trillions of dollars of 
abatement costs.’ Nordhaus thinks climate change won’t wreck the planet, but he isn’t 
sure. Meanwhile, ‘[w]e should start with the clear and present dangers, after which we 
can turn to the unclear and distant threats.’ 
 This logic is weak. There is no reason to be confident that that ‘starting with 
the clear and present dangers’ will work. If climate change poses the threat of 
catastrophe, we may need to act now (cf. Hansson, 2004, p. 357). Moreover, the fact 
that a threat is unclear says nothing about whether it is small. We are dealing not with 
a well-defined risk, but with an uncertain chance of disaster. We might gamble and 
have bad luck; we could also be wrong from the outset about what the odds really are 
(Arrow et al., 1996, p. 67; Ryan, 2007, p. 176). We are especially likely to misjudge 
the probability of unlikely risks (Bier et al., 2004, pp. 78, 93). Uncertainty about 
climate change gives grounds for greater caution rather than less (Broome, 1992, pp. 
17-18; Stern, 2009, p. 35). As Weitzman (2009, p. 5) observes:   
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The tiny probabilities of nightmare impacts of climate change are all 
such crude ballpark estimates (and they would occur so far in the future) 
that there is a tendency in the literature to dismiss altogether these highly 
uncertain forecasts on the “scientific” grounds that they are much too 
speculative to be taken seriously….[But] other things being equal, the 
more speculative and fuzzy are the tiny tail probabilities of extreme 
events, the less ignorable and the more serious is the impact on present 
discounted expected utility for a risk-averse agent. 
 Here the preponderant weight of the future comes back into play. Both 
egalitarianism and utilitarianism admit a case for discounting losses to future people if 
they will be better off. But neither an aversion to inequality nor declining marginal 
utility justifies discounting their interest in being as well off as we are. Global 
warming could impoverish future people for many decades, for centuries, or even for 
good. Even if it did not leave them economically worse-off, it could deprive them of 
good health or other basic needs, bringing them below the threshold of sufficiency in 
another fashion. Rich people as well as poor ones deserve protection against being 
poisoned or cooked (Caney, 2008, pp. 550-51; Davidson, 2008, p. 472; Spash, 2005, 
pp. 228-29).  In contrast, provided economic growth continues, the material misery of 
today’s poor countries ‘must eventually be eradicated’ (Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, 
p. 119). If economic growth does not continue, this is likely to be the result of 
runaway climate change or another catastrophe like nuclear war.
6
 In the United States, 
‘increases in prosperity are likely notwithstanding the aging of the Baby Boom 
generation’, observes Neil Buchanan (2009c, 1270-72, emphasis added), 
with even pessimistic forecasts showing impressively high cumulative 
economic growth leading to very high average future living standards….The 
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estimates from the Social Security Trustees…have been very steady over the 
years, and the scale of revisions necessary to result in a forecast of zero net 
growth (or something even close to that level) over a several-decade span 
appear to be beyond reason. Short of unpredictable cataclysms (weather-
related disasters, world war, the collapse of global capitalism), these 
forecasts are apparently among the most solid available. 
 If we must choose between two policies, both of which may impoverish 
people’s lives, we ought to choose the one that minimizes expected per capita 
deprivation. This is a product of the share of the total population—present and 
future—who are at risk, the estimated probability of their falling below the threshold 
of sufficiency, and the likely severity of the deprivation.
7
 Given the vast number of 
future people, barring the chance of human extinction, any significant likelihood of 
permanent impoverishment must outweigh even a high probability of continued 
poverty in parts of the world over the next few generations.
8
   
Strictly speaking, such tradeoffs are unnecessary; ambitious abatement measures 
need impoverish no one. While their cost would be large in absolute terms, as a 
percentage of world income they are small, with Nordhaus (2008, p. 90) estimating 
their cost at 1.5 percent. Weitzman (2007, p. 720) notes the Stern Review’s stress on 
the immorality of relegating future generations to live under the shadow 
of the open-ended possibilities of uncertain large-scale changes in the 
climate system, when for a mere annuity cost of a percent or two (or at 
most three) of GDP each year we might have purchased an insurance 
policy on their behalf that avoided this scary uncertainty (or at least 
greatly reduced it) …. 
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Ambitious mitigation need not bring a single person below the poverty line if we 
were only prepared to redistribute enough resources.
9
 ‘The fallacy’, Richard Posner 
(2004, p. 115) observes, ‘…is to think that we have a choice between only two 
policies: we can either expand health insurance or take measures against 
catastrophic risks. We can do both. We would just have to give up something else.' 
MOTIVATING MITIGATION 
 But it doesn’t seem we will. Since today’s rich states reap most of the benefits 
of carbon emissions, while externalising most of the costs to other countries, species 
and generations, they have a strong incentive to continue (cf. Gardiner, 2006b).  Nor 
do the world’s poor seem ready to make cuts that restrict their economic development 
(Malnes, 1995, p. 125). Powerful countries might impose the costs of mitigation on 
weaker ones—a process which may already be underway (Isla, 2009). Of course, this 
would be deeply unfair. In particular, policies that deprived the poor of necessities so 
that the rich could continue their ‘luxury emissions’ would be a crying injustice 
(Shue, 1993). All the same, it would be a lesser injustice than risking long-term 
catastrophe. As Clark Wolf (2009, p. 373) puts it, ‘Unless our efforts to mitigate the 
effects of climate change will cause more misery and deprivation than they will 
relieve, we have an obligation of justice to undertake them.’ Even the prospect of 
condemning several more generations in the South to poverty—terrible in itself—
dwindles next to the danger of permanent impoverishment.  
 Nevertheless, far better that the rich should pay for abatement. The problem is 
that they are unwilling to do enough. And indeed, while they should do more, it does 
not seem quite fair to ask them to bear the whole burden. We ought to pursue 
ambitious mitigation, because we live at a time when climate change is coming to a 
head. But this may leave us with a lower material standard of living than our parents 
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enjoyed (Malnes, 1995, p. 108). At the same time, our descendants are likely to be 
materially far richer. The problem is not that they are likely to be impoverished if we 
do not do enough. Rather it is that if things turn out much worse than we expect, they 
could be disastrous indeed. Abatement is akin to taking out an insurance policy, or 
investing in bonds rather than stocks: it ‘reduces the variance in what may happen’ 
(Broome, 1992, pp. 17-18, quotation at p. 17; Roser, 2009a, p. 21, n. 46).
10
  
 Suppose I hold a well-paid job with good prospects for promotion. Barring 
accidents, I can expect to save enough to leave my heirs a large legacy. Yet if I am 
killed on the job and a market crash wipes out my savings, I will leave my family 
penniless. Of course I should take out life insurance. That my heirs will probably be 
richer is no excuse for exposing them to disaster. Yet finding the payments onerous, I 
may be tempted to skimp, and hope for the best. That would be the wrong choice. It 
would be better to save less, and use the money to pay the insurance premiums. That 
would not be unfair to my heirs: they will still have more than I had. Nor is it unfair to 
put my savings in bonds with a lower rate of return.
11
 If I live to a ripe old age, my 
heirs will inherit a smaller fortune, but still more than I have now. Since I already 
have enough to live comfortably, they will have comparatively little interest in 
‘potential gains…above the minimum that can be guaranteed by the maximin 
approach’.12 This is a paradigmatic case for precautionary action (Gardiner, 2006a, p. 
47). It is better to inherit less, but to be spared the threat of disaster.  
 Likewise, in the case of catastrophic threats, we ought to take out ‘insurance’. 
It is fair for the rich to make their still richer descendants pay part of the premium (cf. 
Lind, 1995, p. 382). Indeed, if we anticipate that our descendants will be richer, there 
is some case for transferring resources from the future even if we use them simply for 
our own consumption (Gaspart and Gosseries 2007; Zelenak, 2009). When we borrow 
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from our grandchildren for their own protection, the case becomes overwhelming. 
Some find the notion that we could legitimately pass on costs to our descendants hard 
to swallow. Is not ‘seeing our children and grandchildren do better than we have 
done…the real promise of America’, as Senator Hatch asserts (2009)? It is hard to see 
why this must be the case. We have no reason to think that they will be more virtuous 
or harder-working than we are. As Brian Barry (1983, p. 20) observes, ‘none of the 
usual justifications for an unequal claim—special relationships arising in virtue of 
past services, promises, etc.—applies here’ (cf. Tremmel, 2009, p. 175). An 
inheritance equal to our own is the obvious baseline. Deep cuts in GHG emissions 
promise our descendants the best chance of receiving at least that much. 
 The challenge is to find ways of transferring resources from the future (Lind, 
1995, pp. 382-83). One possible means is public debt (Bradford, 1999, p. 42; Revesz, 
1999, p. 1007). Economists have long debated whether the present generation is able 
to pass on the burden of the public debt at all.
13
 Indeed, it does not seem possible for 
the present generation taken as a whole to borrow money from the future. Any loan 
made now comes out of today’s spending and investment, and will in turn be repaid to 
future people (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 324-25). Nevertheless, public debt may transfer 
wealth from present-day creditors to present-day citizens and taxpayers, and in turn 
from future taxpayers to future creditors (Lerner, 1961). It benefits today’s taxpayers 
at the expense of tomorrow’s. And it is today’s taxpayers who must be persuaded to 
foot the bill. 
 Some deplore such intergenerational cost-shifting as unjust (Boettcher and 
Tremmel, 2005; Wolf, 2008). ‘What will…$400 million for climate change research 
do to help you and your family?’ demands US Representative Michele Bachmann 
(2009), complaining that the Obama administration’s stimulus package will ‘cost the 
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American taxpayers, their children and their grandchildren more than $1 trillion’. 
Warning of ‘global warming taxes that will hike costs for every American who turns 
on a light switch’, Representative Lynn Westmoreland (2009) denounces a ‘felonious 
theft from future generations with the trillions in IOUs we’ll be handing them.’ Yet 
even if running up debt means our descendants pay higher taxes, or receive fewer 
government benefits, this will not make them poorer than we are so long as the rise in 
pretax incomes keeps pace (Buchanan, 2004, p. 314; Buchanan, 2009c, p. 1292; 
Gaspart and Gosseries, 2007, pp. 206-7). Critics of deficit spending must explain why 
we owe them more.
14
 
 At some point government borrowing could become unsustainable (Shaviro, 
2009). If Britain, for example, cannot issue further debt without risking a ‘buyers’ 
strike’ from the bond market (Lanchester, 2010; cf. Weale, 2009, p. 5), then further 
deficit financing may not be an option. The question is whether most leading 
industrialized economies are near that point. It is hard to believe that after so much 
deficit spending—including the huge sums spent lately on the bank bailouts—debt-
funded climate change mitigation is the feather that would break the camel’s back. 
Indeed, some argue that with national economies functioning at less than full capacity, 
deficit spending is likely to stimulate the economy and private investment, increasing 
resources for both present and future people. In any case, the question is a practical 
one, rather than a matter of intergenerational justice. If we have reason to worry about 
deficits at all, it concerns their fiscal sustainability today, not because they amount to 
‘generational theft’ from our descendants (Buchanan, 2009b, pp. 50-52).  
 Another way to compensate ourselves at the future’s expense is to save and 
invest less in other areas, spend less on research and development, and consume 
resources in an unsustainable fashion (Zelenak, 2009, p. 1361; cf. Modigliani, 1961, 
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p. 736; Revesz, 1999, p. 1007). ‘[A] global climate initiative that is for reasons 
economic or political likely to crowd out basic scientific research’, Lawrence 
Summers and Richard Zeckhauser argue (2008, p. 133), ‘should be judged more 
harshly than an equivalent project that would affect only consumption.’ Should it? 
Only if we ought to increase the wealth of the future. If future people are likely to be 
richer, there is at least as strong an argument for investing less (Mishan, 1963, p. 539 
n. 16). ‘[N]o substantive case’, maintains Clive Spash (2005, p. 238), ‘has been made 
that controlling emissions would do more than reduce the rate of growth of material 
consumption for industrially developed economies.’ Growth in living standards comes 
not only from saving and sacrifice, but also from technological and institutional 
innovation (Brennan, 2007, p. 280; Gaspart and Gosseries, 2007, p. 206; Tremmel, 
2009, pp. 165-66). If we fund climate change mitigation by dissaving in other areas, 
this can and will be offset up to a point by the accumulation of human knowledge.
15
  
 There is also a strong pragmatic argument in favour of burden-shifting to the 
future: the present generation seems more likely to support abatement if it can pass on 
part of the costs (Bradford, 1999, p. 42; cf. Weale, 2009, p. 6).  While voters might 
balk at policies that explicitly transferred wealth from the future (Zelenak, 2009, p. 
1381), they already elect politicians who run up debt merely to fund increased 
consumption (Kielmansegg, 2003). When debt is used to reduce the threat to future 
generations, as in the case of a just war, the moral case for burden-shifting is far 
stronger. ‘Quite aside from obvious incentive considerations’, as Franco Modigliani 
(1961, p. 753) observes, ‘there may be perfectly good equity reasons for lightening 
the burden of the generation that suffered through the war by granting them a more 
comfortable life after the war, at the expense of later generations.' The same goes for 
lightening the sacrifices our generation must bear to avert the threat of catastrophic 
  17   
climate change. Faced with curbs on carbon emissions, Eric Posner (2007, pp. 142-
43) warns, American ‘[c]onsumers would respond by saving less and spending more 
at the margin’ and ‘might simply demand additional government programs that 
transfer wealth from the future to the present—for example, tax cuts without spending 
cuts and thus increased debt, or energy projects that degrade the environment in a 
manner outside the jurisdiction of the [US Environmental Protection Agency], or 
disinvestment in basic research.’ That would be an acceptable price to pay. Our duty 
is not to make the rich of the future richer, but rather to avert disaster. 
 Transfers of wealth from the future should be used to fund abatement not only 
at home in the North, but also, and especially, in the South. Not only is these 
countries’ participation essential in the long run, but here there is the strongest case on 
the basis of equity for tapping the wealth of the North’s descendants, who can be 
expected, if catastrophe is averted, to be far richer than most inhabitants of the South 
today (Buchanan, 2009a, pp. 1404-5; Buchanan, 2009c, p. 1256). It is well known that 
the rich countries contribute less foreign aid than philosophers say they should. They 
may be more willing to fork over if they can pass on part of the bill. Happily, there is 




 Utilitarianism notoriously allows the trivial interests of the many to 
overwhelm the vital interests of the few. This is enough, in Nordhaus’s (2008, pp. 
182-83) eyes, to damn the Stern Review. ‘Using its growth projections’, he charges,  
the Stern Review would justify reducing per capita consumption for one 
year today from $6,600 to $2,900 in order to prevent a reduction of 
consumption from $87,000 to $86,900 starting two centuries hence and 
continuing at that rate forever after. This bizarre result arises because the 
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value of the future consumption stream is so high with near-zero time 
discounting that we should sacrifice a large fraction of today's income in 
order to increase a far-future income stream by a very tiny fraction. 
Nordhaus’s solution is to discount the value of additional consumption by future 
people. This solution is misleading. In reality, we do not—or, at any rate, should 
not—believe that people’s consumption matters less merely because they will live in 
the future. As Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit (1992, p. 148) advise, ‘we should say 
what we mean.’  What we mean is that no benefits to the well-off, however numerous 
the latter may be, can ever justify depriving the needy. We need an ethic that will not 
allow the luxuries of the rich to trump the needs of the poor. We find this in 
minimizing expected deprivation. 
 Once we reject utilitarianism, we no longer need to discount. We are more 
than rich enough to minimize expected deprivation without assuming intolerable 
burdens. In the case of climate change, we have the choice of two ideal type strategies 
for doing this. On the one hand, we can pursue ambitious mitigation; on the other, we 
can let the planet warm on the assumption that our savings and additional growth will 
allow us to adapt successfully to climate change, or compensate for the damage 
(Toman, 2005, p. 82).
17
 Adaptation and compensation may work out—for humans, if 
not for other species—but they carry the small chance of long-term or even permanent 
catastrophe. In contrast, so long as mitigation is not so drastic as to halt growth, 
within a century even today’s poor states should be far richer than they are today. 
Given the vast number of future people who would suffer from runaway climate 
change, minimizing expected deprivation calls for precaution. As Wolf (2009, p. 373, 
emphasis in original) says, ‘Present investment to mitigate climate change does not 
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aim to make later generations better off than earlier ones. Instead, it aims to protect 
later generations from risks that might make them much worse off than earlier ones.'
18
  
 We can easily afford to spend one or two percent of world income and still 
meet everyone’s basic needs. The benefits the rich would forego in order to avert the 
threat of disaster are trivial in comparison. Yet they refuse to do so. Fortunately, 
through long-term borrowing or diverting funds from other investments, we can 
ensure that the rich of the future share the burden of climate mitigation. As Wilfred 
Beckerman and Joanna Pasek (2001, p. 105, emphasis added) observe,  
Future generations are likely to be much richer than is the current generation, 
and there is little reason to believe that the steady rise in real incomes will be 
significantly reduced by climate change….However, we do have a moral 
obligation to take account of the possibility, however small, that climate change 
could seriously depress the living standards of future generations.
19
 
Well said. But this means that the world has little to lose and much to gain from 
passing on part of the burden of abatement. Our much richer descendants can well 
afford to pay off some debt if this ensures that they really are richer. 
  
                                                 
1
 Jamieson, 2005, p. 227; Spash, 2005; Tol, 2008, p. 442; cf. Evers, Stamf and Traufetter, 2010. 
2
 Or would it? Rawls (1971/1999, p. 84) suggests that the worst-off might be defined as ‘unskilled 
worker[s]’, or ‘all persons with less than half of the median’ income and wealth. That is to define 
‘worst off’ fairly inclusively. In this case, Meyer’s and Roser’s (2009, p. 224, emphasis added) warning 
that maximin requires us to prioritise ‘the smallest improvement of the smallest number of the worst 
off’ may not apply to Rawls. Rawls himself did not extend his difference principle to relations between 
countries or generations, and might reject the prioritarian analysis developed here (thanks to an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out). 
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3
 Maximizing the proportion of future lives above sufficiency is, however, plausible as a population 
principle. See Rendall, forthcoming, n. 31.  
4
 This should not encourage us to kill off people whose lives fall below the sufficiency threshold—a 
criticism sometimes levelled at average utilitarianism (McMahan, 1981, 113). Premature death is in 
most cases a particularly severe form of deprivation. Killing even badly-off people would increase 
average deprivation rather than diminishing it. 
5
 Beckerman, 1995, pp. 92-95; Goklany, 2001, p. 81; Schelling, 1995; Tol, 2008, p. 442. 
6
 Brennan, 2007, p. 277; Tremmel, 2009; cf. Helm, 2008; Posner, 2004, p. 165. 
7
 Compare Roser’s (2009c, pp. 9-10) consideration of a rule minimizing the expected probability of 
rights violations, possibly weighted according to their severity. Cf. also Malnes (1995, pp. 64-65).  
8
 Minimizing expected deprivation is thus sensitive to probabilities, and thus does not always entail 
eliminating the worst-case scenario. The very worst scenario in the case of climate change is that we 
spend lots of money and catastrophic climate change ensues anyway (Chisholm and Clarke, 1993, p. 
114). Moreover, instead of runaway climate change, we could suffer some other long-term catastrophe 
such as an asteroid collision or nuclear war. We might then wish we had pursued the business-as-usual 
strategy. Ambitious GHG cuts, however, could well avert catastrophe. Economizing on mitigation, in 
contrast, promises only modest additional resources. Perhaps we would save enough to deflect an 
asteroid or prevent some other catastrophe, but it is far from sure that the money would actually go to 
fund such projects rather than to tax cuts or agribusiness subsidies. Nor will saving 1-3% of GWP do 
much to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Ambitious action against global warming remains the best 
strategy for minimizing expected deprivation. 
9
 Caney, 2009, p. 179; Spash, 2005, p. 232; cf. Gardiner, 2006a, pp. 55 n. 68, 56 n. 71; Wolf, 2009, p. 
362. 
10
 Why, rather than pursuing abatement, should we not just literally take out insurance? Some have 
suggested this solution. Yet even if money can compensate for environmental damage (a big if), it 
would not be an adequate buffer if we were unlucky. If we suffered a worldwide disaster, even if it did 
not lead to mass deaths or human extinction, it is highly unlikely that insurers could compensate all 
losses (Price, 2003).  
11
 I am grateful to Dominic Roser for suggesting the analogy of buying bonds. 
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12
 If the reduced legacy leaves my heirs poorer than their contemporaries, to be sure, they might suffer 
relative deprivation even if they are comfortably off. They could become seriously discontented, thus 
falling below the threshold of sufficiency (Huseby, 2010). An analogous problem could arise if some 
countries incur heavy mitigation expenses while others free-ride off their efforts, leaving the latter with 
higher national incomes. But while invidious comparisons between countries may cause some 
frustration (Graham, 2005, pp. 49-50), this remains a minor danger compared to impoverishment. 
13
 For reviews and discussions of the literature, see Cooper (1986); Labonte and Makinen (2005); 
Vaughn and Wagner (1992). Ferguson (1964) collects most of the early work. 
14
 For an attempt to do so, see Shaviro (2009). 
15
 Tremmel (2009, pp. 165-68, 197-99) argues that innovation makes it unnecessary for us to save more 
than we inherited, but that ‘[n]o generation has the right to dissave’ (p. 167).Tremmel, however, 
believes that we are obliged to promote increasing welfare over time. If intergenerational equity 
requires only equal welfare, then gains produced by innovation could compensate for a modest amount 
of dissaving (cf. Zelenak, 2009, p. 1361). 
16
 Anti-cosmopolitans might criticise the transfer of resources to other countries. By minimizing the 
threat of global catastrophe, however, such transfers will benefit the rich countries’ own future citizens. 
17
 Roser (2009c, p. 19) maintains that we should aim at rising utility levels for future generations so as 
to provide a margin of safety in case things go worse than we expect. This would be certainly better 
than doing nothing—but higher spending directly on disaster-aversion projects would be a more 
efficient form of ‘insurance’.   
18
 This does raise the concern that even tiny possibilities that the world could fall permanently below 
sufficiency would acquire huge weight, requiring us ‘to devote all our resources to catastrophe-averting 
projects above the modest expenditures necessary to maintain at a subsistence level the scientific and 
technical personnel employed on the projects’ (Posner, 2004, p. 153). I plan to address this issue in a 
future paper. 
19
 Beckerman and Pasek themselves deny that there is ‘any need to sacrifice current standards of living 
[through mitigation] in order to protect posterity from poverty’ (2001, p. 105). 
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